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THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE: THE SEARCH
FOR A RATIONALE
Although the National Labor Relations Act 1 contains no express
authorization for the condonation doctrine, it is clearly the creature of,
and is almost as old as that first statement of a national labor relations
policy.2 The doctrine has taken shape through its use by the National
Labor Relations Board as an administrative tool for the effectuation of
what the Board has seen as its statutory mandate. Despite the relatively
few instances in which the doctrine has been applied, by the mid-1950's
there existed a fairly definite concept of condonation, its meaning and its
availability.
Stated simply, the doctrine is invoked by the Board to justify orders
to reinstate employees who have done acts for which the employer has the
right to discharge or to refuse reinstatement when the employer can be
said to have "condoned" the misconduct. The employer's action or inaction is crucial in the doctrine's operation and has almost exclusively
occupied the attention of the Board and the courts. In the recent past,
a shift in the evaluation of employers' actions has developed-due in large
part to judicial rather than administrative initiative. This transformation
has not only limited condonation's earlier pro-employee orientation but has
called into question the doctrine's continued validity, at least insofar as
its original raison d'etre is concerned. It is difficult, however, to determine
the extent to which this change contradicts earlier thinking, because the
doctrine's rationale has remained undiscussed and ill-defined. This Note
attempts to suggest, by an examination of the doctrine's development, both
a source and a rationale, and to measure against these its contemporary
application.
I. THER STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Any discussion of condonation must be introduced by a survey of the
relevant sections of the National Labor Relations Act. Most important to
the doctrine's operation are sections 2(3) s and 10(c). 4 Section 2(3)
extends the definition of "employee" to one "whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because
I National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§151 (1958).
2The condonation doctrine first appeared in Stewart Die Casting Corp., 14
N.L.R.B. 872 (1939), enforced, 114 F.2d 849 (1940), cerl. denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941).
3 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).
4 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
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of any unfair labor practice . . . ." r Thus the striker expressly retains,
with some qualifications, his status as an employee. 6 Section 10(c) empowers the Board to "issue . . . an order [to employers] . . . to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the] Act . . . .""7 It is
by the exercise of this power that the Board can remedy discriminatory
discharges, replacements, and other consequences of overt labor conflict.8
Section 7,0 which is the source of the rights and protections guaranteed
to employees in their disputes with employers, forms an important, albeit
highly generalized, background against which condonation cases must be
viewed.

It gives employees the right "to engage in . . . concerted ac-

tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .

10

*.".."

Section 7 rights are made meaningful through the

commands of section 8(a), 11 which condemns certain employer actions as
unfair labor practices. Particularly important are section 8(a) (1), which
makes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees" in their exercise of section 7 rights,' 2 and section 8(a) (3),
which prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .

.

. .""

The effect of these sections

is to check employer action motivated by a desire to prevent unionization
or to so frustrate union activity that the union will lose the support of his
employees.
On the other hand, the NLRA does not forbid the employer to discharge employees for their participation in unprotected activities-or for
561 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).

6
See, e.g., Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 94 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 579 (1938); NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938). The strike or labor dispute need not still
be in existence when the matter comes before the Board. Eagle-Picher Mining &
Smelting Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 1941). Prior to the NLRA,
courts, on an ad hoc basis, reached similar conclusions as to employee status. See,
e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42,
67-68 (1924) (men otherwise entitled to be considered employees for the purposes
of the Clayton Act did not lose that status because of strike against a public utility) ;
Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 731 (1937) (men retained employee status for purpose of subjecting their
pre-Wagner Act dispute to the processes of the NLRB); Iron Molders' Union v.
Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908) (concurring opinion) (under
state labor law).
761 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
s See, e.g., NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1007 (1956); NLRB v. Good Coal Co., 110 F.2d 501 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940); John H. Barr Marketing Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 875 (1951),
aff'd per curiam, 204 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1953).

9 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
10 Ibid.
1161 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
'261 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
Is 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)

(Supp. II, 1961).
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no reason at all. However, assertion by the employer that an employee
was discharged for a reason other than one forbidden under the act will not
prevent the Board from examining all relevant information concerning the
discharge-including, if necessary, the firm's entire history of employerunion relations-to determine the actual motive for the discharge.1 4 Once
the Board finds that the employee was engaged in a protected activity,
proof that the discharge was motivated by that activity is sufficient to
support a finding that the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice.

II.

OPERATION OF THE DOCTRINE

The condonation doctrine operates in situations in which the employer
seeks to justify a discharge as motivated by the employee's participation in
unprotected conduct. Suppose, for example, that a union calls a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause in its contract and the employer discharges
all the participants. Several days later he asks the men to return to work,
which they do. Subsequently the employer discharges some of the men for
their participation in the strike. They file a complaint with the Board,
alleging a violation of their rights under the NLRA in that they were
fired for their union activity. The Board would find that the strike was
unprotected because it violated the no-strike agreement, that this cost the
employees the protection of the act, and that the employer had the right
to discharge them for that activity. However, the Board's opinion is likely
to continue by pointing out that the employer, by asking the men to return
and delaying their discharge until after they had been reinstated, indicated
that he condoned the unprotected activity and thus could no longer justify
his action by reliance on that misconduct. Condonation, then, operates to
remove the defense that the discharged employees participated in an unprotected activity by which the employer may normally overcome a charge
that he has violated section 8(a). There appear to be two theories on
which this result can be justified. The first is that an examination of the
employer's behavior discloses that his actual motive in ordering the discharge was other than to discipline the discharged employees for their unprotected activity. In this view, return and reinstatement of the men at his
request--conduct loosely labeled as condonation-indicates that their unprotected activities were not the real reason for their discharge. The
employer's subsequent invocation of these actions to justify his own may
then be viewed as a pretext cloaking his actual but unacceptable motive.
The second analysis treats the employer's behavior more formally. By
his failure to discharge immediately, giving the unprotected conduct as the
reason, the employer may be said to be estopped from raising this defense.
Under this view procedural considerations may become all important-the
14 See Bell Bakeries, 126 N.L.R.B. 522 (1960); Mid-South Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.
R.B. 230 (1958); Warren Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 689 (1950), enforced, 197 F.2d 814 (5th
Cir. 1952).
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time the justification is raised or the failure to raise it at all. Under the
motive theory, the use of condonation terminology would seem to be unnecessary to the decision of the ultimate issue, motive, whereas under the
estoppel theory, condonation may be used to avoid any search into actual
motivation.
III.

EMPLOYEE CONDUCT AND

CONDONATION

As may have been suggested by the preceding example, normally the
employee conduct leading to discharge which results in the invocation of
the condonation doctrine is conduct which is not, on the one hand, protected under the NLRA, or, on the other, clearly outlawed by either that
act or some other federal statute. The employer can obviously gain nothing
by asserting that the discharge was motivated by the employee's protected
conduct; he is less likely to reinstate employees who have engaged in
illegal activities, since these activities are both more likely to be of a
serious nature and more easily recognized as justifications for discharge.
Moreover, although it is theoretically possible for the condonation doctrine
to be applied whether the activity alleged as the motive for the discharge
is illegal or merely unprotected, distinctions have been drawn between these
classes of cases.
A. Illegal Activities
The condonation doctrine has never been applied when the employer's
justification for an allegedly discriminatory discharge was that the employee's activities were not merely unprotected, but actually illegal under
the act, and the Board, in Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,15 has held that its
application in such cases would be improper. The reasoning behind this
position apparently is that the employer cannot sanction what constitutes
a direct violation of an express legislative command; the conduct affects
more than just the employer and it is the Board's duty to redress the
greater affront. 16 In reaching its conclusion in Mackay, the Board failed
to come to grips with the underlying problem, although the result of the
case might be supported-at least to some degree-by sounder arguments
than those suggested. For, it must be remembered, the condonation doctrine is not the result of an express congressional command, and, hence,
the Board may be justified in limiting the doctrine's application to the area
of its peculiar competence. Since the Board bears a greater responsibility
for the formulation and enforcement of the policy of the NLRA than it
does concerning those activities under the act which have been subject to
express congressional definition, it seems proper that the Board should
employ its creature, condonation, in the first area but not the second.
15 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951).
16 Id. at 743.

THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE

Nevertheless, the apparent assumption of the Board in Mackay that condonation can have no place in cases in which the activity used to justify a
discharge is illegal under the act is rooted in an unrealistic view of the
law. Those activities which Congress chose to make illegal are subject
to a range of sanctions which will operate regardless of the intrusion of
condonation into these areas; the Board can at once entertain an allegation
that the union committed an unfair labor practice and a separate contention
that the employer should reinstate the employees whose activities constituted that unfair labor practice because the employer condoned those
activities. Unless the union's unfair labor practice is one which, under
the act, results in a loss of employee status,1 7 there is no reason to hold that
however long a time has elapsed between the activity and the dismissal and
however much the employer may have condoned the activity, the Board
may not simplify its search into the motivation of allegedly discriminatory
discharges by use of the condonation doctrine whenever the employer
claims to have based his discharge on the illegal activity of the employees
discharged.
The Mackay decision may be described in yet another way: whereas
employee conduct which is merely unprotected serves only to permit the
employer to discharge the employee without committing an unfair labor
practice, illegal employee conduct automatically terminates the employment
relationship. If this conclusion can be sustained, illegal employee activities
need not be the reason, real or announced, for the discharge; in these cases
the employer cannot be forced to reinstate the employee even when the
true and provable motive for the discharge clearly falls within the prohibitions of sections 8(a) (1) or 8(a) (3).
Nevertheless, the language of the NLRA strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to make all activities illegal under the act the source
of an automatic loss of employee status. Thus, section 8(d) provides that
an employee "shall lose his status as an employee" for participation in a
strike within the sixty-day "cooling-off" period.18 Section 8(d) is the
only provision of the NLRA which in effect makes the employee an "outlaw" for violating it and thus frees the employer of any obligation to justify
his disciplinary action by reliance on the particular condemned conduct. 19
The absence from other sections of the act of a similar specific deprivation
of employee status implies that the employer must take positive action to
dismiss an employee whose conduct was illegal under these sections.
It might further be argued that the language of these sections, in not
providing for the automatic termination of employee status, would make
17 See text accompanying notes 18-19 infra.

18 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958). The employee's loss of status
terminates upon reinstatement by the employer. This explicit restoration of status is
apparently an expression of a congressional desire to safeguard the employee from
further harassment once he has been reemployed.
1) A critical view of this provision may be found in Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. Rv. 274, 280-81 (1948).
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additional restrictions upon employer freedom-such as that provided by
the condonation doctrine-appropriate with regard to dismissals allegedly
justified by their violation. This argument is consistent with both condonation analyses. The restriction on employer freedom, arguably permissible in the absence of a specific deprivation of status, is reflected in the
motive analysis' insistence that the disciplinary action be grounded upon
the unprotected activity. This parallels the estoppel analysis' scrutiny of
employer behavior to ensure that he is limited as to when and how he can
exercise his legitimate power of response to unprotected labor activity.
The persuasiveness of this argument for the application of condonation to violations of the act is questionable. A strong argument that Congress did not intend to allow the Board great freedom in this area can be
based on the conference committee report on the proposed Taft-Hartley
Act.2 0 The House wanted section 7 to state "specifically that the rights
set forth were not to be considered as including the right to commit or
partcipate in unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities or violations of collective bargaining contracts." 21 The House appears to have
had in mind early Board decisions ordering reinstatement in cases of sitdown strikes, mutiny, and mass picketing 2 2 Since the courts had denied
enforcement of these orders and the Board seemed to have acquiesced, the
provision was omitted.2 3 Thus, even if the statutory language can be used
to support a conclusion that illegal activities not within the purview of
section 8(d) do not result in an automatic termination of employee status,
it is difficult to extend this argument to suggest that the Board was to be
allowed the same freedom in dealing with activities illegal under the act
as it had in creating and applying techniques whose purpose was to further
the policy of the act, a policy which the Board itself was, by its very nature,
largely responsible for formulating.24
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1947).
21 Id. at 38.
22The cases referred to are probably Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. 5 N.L.R.B.
930, rev'd, 98 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sitdown
strike); Southern S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26 (1940), modified, 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.
1941), modified, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (mutiny); and Indiana Desk Co., 58 N.L.R.B.
48 (1944), modified, 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945) (mass picketing). Only the last
is specifically mentioned in the report.
23H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947).
24There has'been no litigation involving the application of the condonation doctrine to conduct which was unprotected and illegal because it was in violation of a
law other than the NLRA. However, it would seem that the reasoning behind
Mackay's rejection of the doctrine's applicability would be equally relevant in this
connection. Moreover, since the Board employs condonation to justify its reinstatement orders, any limitation on its power to order reinstatement to effectuate its view
of the act's policy is highly relevant to the doctrine's use. In Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942), the Court, after finding that the employees' strike was
in fact a mutiny, held that the Board's reinstatement order exceeded its authority.
The Board was admonished, in such circumstances, to give due consideration to the
interests, other than those of the act, involved in the dispute. Id. at 47-48; cf. NLRB
v. Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d 260, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1942), which suggests
that state law might be an interest to be accommodated by the Board under the
20
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B. Conduct Against the Policy of the NLRA
It is, then, obvious that activities falling within the second class of unprotected conduct-conduct in conflict with the policies of the NLRA-are
most relevant to a discussion of the condonation doctrine. In these situations the initial problem is to determine whether the means used by labor
to accomplish legal goals can be said to fall outside the protection of section 7. The test announced by the Board in Harnischfeger Corp.2 5 has
been the normal starting point in deciding whether or not a certain activity is within the protected area. The question was there said to be
whether the conduct is so "indefensible" as to be beyond the protection of
the act and to warrant the actor's discharge. Whereas activities which are
illegal under the act are unprotected by definition, other conduct, such as
violence or disloyal behavior may present very close questions.
Shortly after the NLRA was passed, the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp2 6 held that the seizure of a plant through a
sitdown strike was unprotected conduct and that therefore the participants
and employees who aided them lost their right to reinstatement. The
Court condemned the sitdown strike in terms which left little doubt as to
its "indefensibility." 2 7 Although the opinion might be read as indicating
that the conduct automatically cost the men their employee status, the
Court held only that the conduct provided grounds for discharge. This
28
and in other cases
holding has been followed both in later sitdown cases
involving unprotected activity in conflict with the labor act's policies.
Southern S.S. decision. There the court refused to enforce the Board's order to
reinstate a worker whom the Board said had been discriminatorily discharged under
§ 8(a) (1). One of the reasons given for the refusal was that the employer was
obligated to discharge the employee because he was responsible for the pinning of a
"sign, too lewd and lascivious' to be set out, id. at 265, on the back of a female
coworker and in Texas an employer is forbidden by law to permit "any . . . practices . . . calculated to injuriously affect the morals of such employees," id. at 265
n.7. It must be noted, however, that condonation was not raised in either case, and,
in any event, the mutiny statute may properly be considered to express a uniquely
compelling congressional policy. Moreover, it would seem that the same challenges
which are addressed to the validity of the Mackay position are equally applicable to
an extension of it which would deprive the Board of its normal discretion whenever
it is faced with illegal conduct.
25 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938); see Lipton, Misconduct in Concerted Activities
Under the NLRA, 8 LAB. LJ. 299 (1957).
26 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
27

E.g., "illegal in its inception," "illegal."
28NLRB v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
706 (1942) ; Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941). In Aladdin there was the additional factor of a failure
to obey a court order to vacate. In Stewart the Board noted that the sitdown was
peaceful and easily ended. In neither case did the court hold that the employees
automatically lost their rights as a result of the activity, but did say that the employer
would have been justified in discharging them for engaging in the activity.
29 See, e.g., NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 212 F.2d 155 (5th Cir.
1954) (striker who left his post without notice created risk of danger to plant);
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Fafnir Bearing Co., 73
N.L.R.B. 1008 (1947) (violation of collective bargaining agreement).
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The activities which deprive employees of the protection of section 7
of the act because they are, in the eyes of the Board, in conflict with the
policy of the act are many and varied. Among these are strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements-either because of the existence
of an express no-strike clause 3 0 or because of an agreement to follow
grievance procedures 31%_., wildcat 32 and partial strikes-for example, the
hit-and-run strike,33 the weekend strike,34 and "strikes" in which the men
refuse to work overtime 5-, strike-connected violence,3 6 abandonment of
the job at a time when this action is likely to create a danger of injury to
person or property, 37 and what has been labelled "disloyalty"-a term
which includes both such obviously disloyal acts as soliciting fellow employees to work for a competing employer without any connection with a
union-management dispute,3 s and the more difficult cases in which employees in the course of a labor dispute have gone beyond the usual allegations of unfairness and attacked the employer's product.39 Although many
of these forms of conduct are or have been accepted as "normal" in labor
disputes, and although the very congressional mandate encouraging collective bargaining and protecting the economic strike suggests that the natural
consequences of this form of settling labor disputes should not be held to
30
Bechtel Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 891 (1960); Alabama Marble Co., 83 N.L.R.B.
1047 (1949), enforced per curiam, 185 F.2d 1022 (1951); cf. E. A. Labs., Inc. v.
NLRB, 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 871 (1951) (strike in violation
of War Labor Disputes Act).
31 NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950).
32 NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951); NLRB v.

Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
33 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954).
34

Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954).
35Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1594-95 (1954), enforced per

curiam, 230 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1956).

36NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953); NLRB v.
Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d
913, 917 (7th Cir. 1941); American Tool Works Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1681 (1956).
Mere "temporary" violence is not sufficient to deprive employees of the protection of
the act. NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 227 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1007 (1956); Stewart Hog Ring Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 1032 (NLRB 1961); H. N.
Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1133 (1952), modified, 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954);
NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961) (dictum).
Distinctions between "extreme" or "prolonged" violence and that which is merely
"temporary" often must be made by using the standards as statements of conclusions;
much depends on the individual Board member's tolerance level. It is probably safe
to say, however, that when it appears that the employer is seizing upon the violence
as an excuse for discharging the errant employees, the Board will view the employee
conduct more indulgently. See Horn Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1177 (1949).
37
E.g., NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1955) (walkout occurred at time when ladles had to be drained of molten metal);
NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 212 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1954) (employee
left the boiler room unattended when he went to join strike).
38
Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1956) ; cf. Mills-Morris
Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1954).

39 NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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be in conflict with the policy of the NLRA, 40 all such activities are con41
sidered unprotected.
Nevertheless, the Board remains competent to assure to participants
in this class of unprotected activity their reinstatement or continued employment through the use of the condonation doctrine. Evidently the
obvious disruptive effects of such conduct upon good labor-management
relations are not considered to be so serious as to preclude their adjustment
through the Board's own efforts. It is difficult to see why abandoning a
boiler room during a strike 42 should be considered a less dangerous or
objectionable technique of labor pressure than the demand of the employees
in Mackay for an "illegal" union-security arrangement. 4 In either case,
it should be possible for the employer to invoke effective sanctions either
through dismissal or appeal to governmental authority. But if he chooses
to "condone" the conduct the Board should, in either case, be able to foreclose the subsequent use of the unprotected conduct as a justification for a
dismissal actually motivated by other and improper purposes. The fact
that Congress has pronounced upon the specific illegality of the one class
of conduct and not the other should only be seen as strengthening the hand
of the employer and the Board in dealing with that conduct, not as justifying the indiscriminate invocation of that conduct to shield the employer
from the Board's efforts to protect worker rights of organization.
When the protection of the act is lost through employee conduct which
is not illegal but merely opposed to the policy of the NLRA, it has been
uniformly held that the employer must act to terminate the employee
status44 and in doing so must designate the unprotected activity as the
cause for the dismissal.4 5 Failure to do so subjects him to a charge of
violating section 8(a) (3). 6 This reasoning is illustrated by the rule that
40
Thus, it seems obvious that Congress realized that some violence was likely
to occur when it permitted strikes and picketting and hence did not intend that all
violence should result in loss of protection for the participants. See the opinion of
Judge Mais in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939),
modified, 311 U.S. 7 (1940):
A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in
it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions
call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest
is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of Congress ....
41
See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1299, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464
(1953); NLRB v. Clearwater Finishing Co., 203 F.2d 938 (4th Cir. 1953) ; PattersonSargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956).
42 See NLRB v. Reynolds & Manley Ltunber Co., 212 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.
1954).
43
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951).
44 Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941); Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1013 (1947).
45
E.g., NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, 228 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), appeal di.zissed,
352 U.S. 802 (1956) ; Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1622 (1950), inodified, 191 F.2d
380 (6th Cir. 1961) ; see NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 1952).
46 Carey Salt Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1946).
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an employer is not permitted to refuse to reinstate an employee because of
misconduct when the fact that the employee had engaged in the misconduct
was not known to him at the time of the discharge. 47 Since the motive for
the discharge could not have been the misconduct, the inference arises that
the real motive was discriminatory. 48 Thus in these cases the employee
can be said to retain some measure of protection in spite of his unprotected conduct, for he can ask the Board to require that his discharge be
justified, at the proper time, by reliance on his misconduct and that only
unprotected conduct provides such a justification.
As has been indicated, the condonation doctrine is used only in cases
involving legal but unprotected conduct, cases which fall within the area of
peculiar competence of the Board. This may also be justified by a determination that illegal activities result in an automatic loss of employee
status. When the employee has only the right to a determination that
his conduct was illegal, the condonation doctrine has no place, for if the
employer need not justify his action by reference to the particular misconduct, whether or not he condoned that conduct is immaterial. The contrary
is true where the employer can only act on the basis of the misconduct.
If he condones the misconduct then he no longer has an acceptable reason
for discharging the employee, whether the estoppel or the motive analysis
is used.

IV.

APPLICATION

OF THE DOCTRINE

Although neither the Board nor the courts have made any consistent
attempt to particularize the conduct which may constitute condonation, the
cases suggest that two quite different views have been used in the development and application of the doctrine. These may be described by the terms
"waiver" and "condonation," and may be best seen in the language which
the Board and the courts have used in describing their actions. It might be
suggested that the waiver language would be logically applicable to what
has been described as the estoppel theory, whereas the condonation language comports with the motive analysis of the doctrine, but no such
polarization has appeared in the cases with any consistency. In fact, a
study of the cases indicates that there had been no consistent use of the
terms-which strongly suggests that any differences were more apparent
than real-until the 1955 case of NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry
Co.4 9 There the Fifth Circuit enunciated a theory of condonation which
made future use of waiver principles inapposite.
47 See Stewart Hog Ring Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 1032, 1035 (NLRB 1961).
48 See

NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, 228 F2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), appeal dis-

missed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1446, 1457
(1958), modified, 273 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1960); Montgomery Ward & Co., 90 N.L.
R.B. 1244, 1312 (1950); Dixie Shirt Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1948), enforced,
176 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1949).
49 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955).

1962]

THE CONDONATION DOCTRINE

The waiver language antedates that of condonation, first coming into
50
use in the case of Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, which involved a
sitdown strike followed by a general strike. The employer refused to reinstate some of the participants. When charged with discriminatory discharge the employer relied upon the sitdown strike for its defense. The
court held that although such unprotected conduct would have justified
discharging the men, the employer, "having raised no question concerning
the status of such employees either prior to, or at the time of the strike
settlement . . . could not do so afterwards." 51 The court also noted that
the employer did not differentiate the sitdown strikers from the other
workers when it urged all of its employees to return to work. Since the
employment status did not automatically terminate as a result of the sitdown strike and the employer did nothing affirmative to end it at the time,
2
the later refusal to reinstate the employees was discriminatory.5 This is
the essence of the waiver application, which, in its reliance on the retention
of employee status, rests on section 2(3). While the Stewart decision was
based on the employer's failure to act, later cases have used the same language to characterize various affirmative actions. For example, in Martin
Schwerin 53 the employer was held to have waived when he took back all
55
of the strikers;; 4 while in NLRB v. Aladdin Indus., Inc. the waiver
consisted of a letter inviting all employees, without any distinction being
drawn on the basis of misconduct, to return to their old jobs if they signed
a promise to perform faithfully in the future.
The condonation terminology had its start in the Board opinion in the
Acme-Evans Co.50 case. There both strikers and nonstrikers engaged in
sufficient violence on the picket line to be unprotected. The employer was
held to have condoned the activity in that it failed to discipline the nonstrikers who had been violent. The opinion reasoned that if the employer
was able to overlook their violence, striker violence should be treated as
similarly unimportant and, therefore, as insufficient to justify denying the
employee his reinstatement.

In Hoover Co.,5 7 the Board found condona-

50 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1940).
51 Id.at 856.

52 Since the strikers refused reinstatement were union members, the refusal was
a violation of § 8(a) (3) in that it was "discrimination in regard to . . . tenure
of employment . . . to . . . discourage membership in any labor organization
" Of course the same result has followed where the employees, although not
...
members, were discharged for sympathy with or support of the union. E.g., NLRB v.
J. G. Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1943); Berkshire Knitting Mills, 46
N.L.RLB. 955, 999, enforced, 139 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1943) (discharge for attendance
at union meeting).
53 72 N.L.R.B. 1356 (1947) (strike in violation of collective bargaining contract).
54 See NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); Alabama Marble Co.,
83 N.L.R.B. 1047, enforced per curiam, 185 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 823 (1951).
55 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 16 U.S. 706 (1942) (sitdown strike).
6624 N.L.R.B. 71, 101 (1940), enforced, 130 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 772 (1943). The court of appeals was more concerned with evidence
of antiunion sentiment such as the distinction drawn between union and nonunion
strikers for purposes of reemployment.
5790 N.L.1RB. 1614 (1950), modified, 191 F.2d 380 (1951).
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tion of mass picketing in letters sent to all employees asking them to return
and in a failure to mention the misconduct in poststrike meetings with the
union.5s Despite the use of condonation terminology in these cases it
seems clear that the decisions were based on the employer's failure to act
affirmatively rather than on his affirmative actions, although the Board in
Hoover suggested that the employer's plea to the men to return to work
provided evidence of a decision by the employer to forgive the misconduct.
Other cases, such as E. A. Labs., Inc.,59 Fafnir Bearing Co.,60 and
Stilley Plywood Co.,61 also found condonation in offers by the employer to
reinstate the employees, but here too there was a failure to delineate the
doctrine with any clarity. Stilley employed both the language associated
with waiver and that common to condonation, while Fafnir used neither
specifically, suggesting that the Board was either having trouble distinguishing the two sets of terminology or was using different labels to describe the same thing.62 Waiver has been used 6 where condonation would
seem to be more appropriate, whereas the Board in Acme-Evans, a waiver
situation, speaks in terms of condonation. The courts of appeals appear
to have been equally confused, although some have required more evidence
of condonation than has the Board. Thus, one court held that mere failure
to make clear to certain employees that they would be treated differently
as a result of their misconduct was insufficient for a finding of condonation; 6 however, another affirmed the Board's position that waiver could
be found in the employer's request that the hitherto unprotected employees
return to work. 65
Thus, prior to 1955, reinstatement of employees was generally being
required unless employers acted promptly and affirmatively to assert dismissal on the basis of unprotected conduct.6 6 Applied in this manner, the
581d. at 1622-25. The letters contained such statements as, "we hope all of you
will return to work Monday," and expressed the hope that "all of our employees . . .
have enjoyed . . . vacations and are . . . ready to work on Monday."

Id. at 1623.

See also California Cotton Co-op. Ass'n, 110 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1954).
59 86 N.L.R.B. 711 (1949), modified, 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342

U.S. 871 (1951).
60

73 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1013-14 (1947).
N.L.R.B. 932 (1951), modified per curiam, 199 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1952),
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cert. denied, 344 U.S. 933 (1953).

62 A later example of this confusion is Pepper & Potter, Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 951,
971 (1953), in which the hearing examiner's finding that condonation consisted of the
failure of the employer to take affirmative action or to discharge the men was adopted
by the Board. This is the basic waiver situation. See text accompanying note 52
supra.
63 See Martin Schwerin, 72 N.L.R.B. 1356, 1367 (1947).
64 NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1950).
65 NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952).
68 As to requisite intent to preserve the employer's rights, see Merck & Co., 110
N.L.R.B. 67 (1954), in which a letter to the union and failure to take a position at
a strike settlement conference were thought consistent with a desire to await the
outcome of state court action; Stockhan Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 629 (1949),

in which the employee remained on the understanding that it was to be only until he
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condonation doctrine assured employees that they might return to work
in most cases despite their unprotected conduct, and it also tended to limit
the opportunities available to employers to vent antiunion sentiments in
that only by a fairly quick discharge could they rid themselves of union
members when misconduct was used as a justification. This is illustrated
by the Board's refusal to permit employers to rely on an acceptable reason
67
for a discharge first raised at a point in time later than the discharge.
By employing fairly flexible language and theory in dealing with condonation, the Board was able to deal more simply with the section 8(a) (3)
issue when the employer sought to mask a discriminatory discharge behind
allegations that his motivation was based on the employee's unprotected
conduct. This result is justifiable only if the misuse of the defense of
employee misconduct makes proof of discriminatory discharge too difficult
too often. But the very fact that the condonation doctrine is invoked in
those cases in which the allegedly discriminatory discharge is distant in
time from the unprotected conduct suggests that the Board is justified in
using its expertise to determine that discrimination rather than the misconduct was the reason for the discharge. Thus, provided the motive
theory is to be taken at its face value, the condonation doctrine serves to
further the mandates of section 8(a) (3).
Nevertheless, although waiver and condonation terminology have been
used apparently interchangeably-despite the fact that the terms can be
and occasionally were applied to situations subject to meaningful distinctions-the Board and courts seem to have been emphasizing procedural
points such as failure to make a timely presentation of the defense, indicating that the waiver analysis was generally being applied. Thus the employer's behavior was not examined directly in a search for motive, but
rather procedural irregularities were seized upon as a waiver of his right
to assert a proper motive.
In 1955 NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co.68 presented a
new and tighter conception of the proper operation of the condonation
doctrine. There the employees engaged in a strike which was timed to
cause maximum injury to the plant. After the strike failed the men were
taken back, but as new employees, with the loss of accrued vacation time
and other benefits. The Board ordered the men reinstated, finding they
were economic strikers who had not been replaced and that the refusal to
reinstate except as new employees violated sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1).
In addition, the Board found that any unprotected activity had been condoned by the employer's failure during the emergency situation expressly
found other work and arbitration proceedings for eight others were completed;
Copperweld Steel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 188 (1947), in which the employees were discharged
after being permitted to return to work, the employer having warned the union that
those responsible would be discharged.
67
E.g., California Cotton Co-op. Ass'n, 110 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1505 (1954) ; Hoover
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1614-25 (1950), modified, 191 F.2d 380 (1951).
68 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955).
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to assign the unprotected activity as the reason for their.discharge and in its
attorney's failure unequivocably to assert justifiable discharge as an affirmative defense to the charge of discrimination, either in the pleadings or before the trial examiner. The court denied enforcement of the Board order;
although it assumed condonation could be considered in the case, it found
none. The court suggested a new test: it "must clearly appear from
some positive act by an employer indicating forgiveness" that the employer
had condoned the misconduct. 69 Although many of the prior cases in which
condonation was found might well satisfy this test-an unconditional permission or request to return to work would be the positive act of forgiveness required 7o-those in which condonation was based on failure to raise
the misconduct defense at poststrike meetings 71 or was inferred from a noncommittal act such as failure to specify that the employees who had taken
part in unprotected activities would not be reinstated, 72 would probably
have been decided otherwise under the Marshall test. The increased burden of proof on the general counsel is obvious; whereas in the pre-Marshall
cases inaction was sufficient to establish condonation, a particular positive
act is now required. This reversal of the doctrine's former employee
orientation can be summed up as a change from "reinstate unless" to "reinstate only if."
Although the Marshall test has now been adopted by another circuit 7a
it does not seem to have significantly altered the Board's view of condonation. Since Marshall the Board has denied condonation in four cases, 74
and has found it twice. 75 In each of the cases denying reinstatement, the
employer had reinstated or never fired other employees who had also
engaged in the unprotected activity assigned as the reason for the discharge
of the petitioners. The Board did not consider this fact alone sufficient.
69 Id. at 414.
70 See NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Dorsey
Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 125 F.2d
377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 706 (1942) ; Stilley Plywood Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
932 (1951), modified, 199 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 933 (1953) ;
Martin Schwerin, 72 N.L.R1B. 1356, 1367 (1947). Compare Longview Furniture Co.,
100 N.L.R.B. 301, 306 (1952), modified, 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953), cited by the
Marshall court, where condonation was denied, the employer's asserted justification
of no-vacancy at the time of the refusal to reinstate being considered an inadequate
indication of intent to condone. The Board distinguished E. A. Labs. and Stilley
Plywood in reaching this result.
71 Pepper & Potter, Inc. 104 N.L.R.B. 951, 971 (1953) ; Hoover Co., 90 N.L.RB.
1614, 1623-24 (1950), modified, 191 F.2d 380 (1951).
72 See NLRB v. E. A. Labs., Inc., 188 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
871 (1951).
73 Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1960). Another court
of appeals which has since been faced with the question refused to find condonation
but made no mention of Marshall. Cleavor-Brooks Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d
637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
74
Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1105 (1960) ; Larkin Coils, 127 N.L.R.B. 1606,
1614 (1960); Bechtel Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 891, 895 (1960); Thayer, Inc., 125 N.L.
R.B. 222, 223 (1959).
75 M. Eskin & Son, 49 L.R.R.M. 1551 (NLRB 1962); Plasti-Line, Inc., 123
N.L.R.B. 1471, 1481 (1959), enforcement denied, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960).
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Nevertheless, while it spoke in terms of the need for a clean slate 76 or
express forgiveness 77 to support a finding of condonation, the Board made
clear that express forgiveness was not always required.7 8 However, in the
first post-1955 case in which condonation was found,7 9 dissenters within
the Board argued for the necessity-as under Marshall--forboth positive
forgiveness and restoration of status, a position supported by the Sixth
Circuit in its refusal to enforce the reinstatement order. The most recent
case before the Board raising the issue of condonation resulted in a finding
of condonation, ° the Board stressing the employer's failure to advert to the
unprotected activity as the reason for the discharges. Thus, although the
decision also referred to the employer's willingness to wipe the slate clean
it would seem that the Board is determined to apply the pre-Marshall
waiver principles.
The Marshall test has been justified as allowing the employer greater
freedom to evaluate what course of action during the turbulent period
which follows strikes involving unprotected conduct will best serve his
interests, without the fear that he will suffer for any inaction. 8' Its strict
requirements help to obviate the objection that the doctrine is merely a
convenient fiction for reaching suspected violations of section 8(a) (3).
However, insofar as the employer can reserve the right to make discharges
82
if he is uncertain of his ultimate evaluation of the unprotected conduct,
any justification of Marshallbased on giving the employer time to plan his
moves loses much of its force.

V.

CONCLUSION

Of the two suggested analyses of the doctrine, motive and estoppel, the
former appears to provide the more persuasive rationale. The basic task
of the Board in deciding section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) cases is to determine
the reason behind the employer's actions. The estoppel analysis, with its
tendency to rely on a formalistic procedural approach, avoids this basic
issue. By examining the factors said to result in condonation as evidence
of motive-albeit evidence which negates the existence of the acceptable
motive rather than necessarily establishing the actual one-the trier can
resolve the ultimate question without being misled by mere procedural
7

6 Thayer, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 222, 223 (1959).

Bechtel Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 891, 895 (1960).
Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1105 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
79 Plasti-Line, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1471 (1959), enftorceinent denied, 278 F.2d 482
(6th Cir. 1960).
80 M. Eskin & Son, 49 L.R.R.M. 1551 (NLRB 1962).
77
78

81 Comment, 24 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 353 (1956).
82 See Merck Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 67, 68-70 (1954)
(employer's agreement for
return of all workers expressly reserved right to discharge those who had engaged
in "criminal or quasi-criminal acts"); Copperweld Steel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 188 (1947).
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irregularities. The integrity of the act is preserved and the possibility that
an employer may be penalized for mere delay or mistake minimized.
The Marshall test does not lend itself to the search for motive as well
as the pre-Marshall view does. The latter-whatever its shortcomings in
application--emphasized the necessity that the employer base his actions
on the proper motive and gave the Board enough discretion to enable it to
hold the employer to that motive. Marshall,on the other hand, by limiting
the employer's acts which can be found to indicate condonation, has the
effect of weakening this limitation on employer freedom of action, in that
it circumscribes more closely the evidence which the Board may use to
negate the professedly proper motive. In view of this, the desirability of
continuing the use of the condonation doctrine should the Marshall test
become dominant may be questioned, for its exclusive reliance upon positive
acts of condonation both avoids the proper and basic question of motive
and narrows the protection previously afforded the employee against discriminatory treatment.
R.M.P.

